a handful of dubious examples from the very large US education system.
here's the otherside, written by someone in the system.
http://chronicle.com/free/v50/i15/15b00701.htm
Should I Have Asked John to Cool It? Standards of Reason in the Classroom
By MICHAEL BERUBE
The class started off innocuously enough. We were in our fifth week of an
undergraduate honors seminar, reading Ishmael Reed's 1972 novel, Mumbo
Jumbo, and I was starting to explain how the novel is built on a series of
deliberate anachronisms, on the way to asking what these tropes from the
1960s were doing in a novel ostensibly set during the Harlem Renaissance. I
began in an obvious (though always fun) place, with Abdul Hamid's encounter
with PaPa LaBas at a rent party, where Abdul delivers a tirade presaging the
rise of the Nation of Islam and protesting U.S. draft policy during the
Vietnam War:
This is the country where something is successful in direct proportion to
how it's put over; how it's gamed. Look at the Mormons. . . .The most
fundamental book of the Mormon Church, The Book of Mormon, is a fraud. If we
Blacks came up with something as corny as the Angel of Moroni, something as
trite and phony as their story that the book is the record of ancient
Americans who came here in 600 BC and perished by AD 400, they would deride
us with pejorative adjectival phrases like "so-called" and "would-be." They
would refuse to exempt our priests from the draft, a privilege extended to
every White hayseed's fruit stand which calls itself a Church. But
regardless of the put-on, the hype, the Mormons got Utah, didn't they?
Unfortunately, to most of my students, the passage was just so much mumbo
jumbo, so I explained briefly that Muhammad Ali's refusal to fight in
Vietnam had been incendiary in the mid-1960s but eventually led the United
States to reconsider its criteria for conscientious-objector status; that
the comparison between members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints and members of the Nation of Islam was a fairly common one at the
time; and that one nationalist group, the Republic of New Africa, had called
for the creation of a separate black nation based in five Southern states,
as partial reparation for slavery.
At that point, John, a large white student in the back of the room, snorted
loudly and derisively: "That's completely ridiculous!" he exclaimed. "It may
seem ridiculous to you, yes," I replied, "and, for the record, I don't
believe there was any possibility that the Republic of New Africa was going
to become a reality. I don't endorse it myself. But it was proposed, and
some black nationalists pointedly compared their relation with the U.S.
government to that of the Mormons."
But John was just getting started. These people are not Africans, he
insisted. They are African-Americans. The whole "Africa" thing is a charade;
racial separatism and identity politics are tearing this country apart;
people have to realize that if they live in this country, no matter how they
got here, they are Americans first, and something-Americans second.
Apparently, we had touched a nerve. I pointed out, gently but (I hoped) not
patronizingly, that whatever any of us might feel about the various projects
of black nationalism, we are, after all, dealing with a character in a
novel -- a character, I hastened to add, whose reductive brand of
nationalism is ultimately undermined in the course of the narrative. It only
makes sense to try to understand what he might be trying to say. And now
let's move on to another example of anachronism in Mumbo Jumbo. ...
The other students in the class -- of various colors and genders, some of
them born on other continents, some of them first-generation college kids
from rural Pennsylvania, none of them African-American -- didn't respond
directly to John's outburst. They were more interested in the novel's use of
anachronism, and uncertain (as so many other readers have been) about
whether to take seriously the novel's various conspiracy theories about
Warren Harding's death, about the demise of the Harlem Renaissance, about
the role of the Freemasons in American history, and about the rise of
Western culture itself. For the moment, the Republic of New Africa had been
forgotten once again -- but John simmered throughout the rest of the hour,
clearly upset that no one had addressed his comment.
Now, I've dealt with students like John before, and I'm sure I'll see them
again, no matter what class I'm teaching. But that semester was different;
it was the fall of 2001, and students' nerves and political opinions were
especially raw. I negotiated any number of delicate exchanges that semester,
and for the past two years I've wondered if I've "dealt with" students like
John in the best possible way.
After class that day, I talked to John at some length as we wandered through
the noontime campus swarms. He was insistent that membership in the American
community requires one to subordinate his or her ethnic-national origin, and
that he himself wanted to be understood not as an American of Russian or
Polish or German "extraction," but simply as an American among other
Americans. And he was just sick and tired of African-Americans refusing to
do the same.
I replied by telling John something like this: "Your position has a long and
distinguished history in debates over immigration and national identity.
It's part of the current critique of multiculturalism, of course, and to a
point I have some sympathy with it, because I don't think that social
contracts should be based on cultural homogeneity." Deep breath. "That
said," I went on, "I have to point out that the terms under which people of
African descent might be accepted as Americans, in 1820 or 1920 or whenever,
have been radically different from the terms under which your ancestors,
whoever they were, could be accepted as Americans. You're right to insist
that you shouldn't be defined by one's ancestry, but, unfortunately, most
African-Americans -- who, by the way, fought and died for integration for
many generations -- didn't have that option. And it shouldn't be all that
surprising that, when African-Americans finally did have the option of
integrating into the larger national community, some of them were profoundly
ambivalent about the prospect."
I didn't press the point that Reed's novel is itself profoundly ambivalent
about that profound ambivalence; I thought that we were now on terrain that
had little to do with the textual details of Mumbo Jumbo, and I was simply
trying to come to an understanding with a student who clearly felt very
strongly about one of the social issues raised in class. We parted amicably,
and I thought that though he wasn't about to agree with me on this one, we
had, at least, made our arguments intelligible to each other.
But the dynamic of the class had been changed. From that day forward, John
spoke up often, sometimes loudly, sometimes out of turn. He had begun to
conceive of himself as the only countervailing conservative voice in a
classroom full of liberal-left think-alikes, and he occasionally spoke as if
he were entitled to reply to every other student's comment -- in a class of
17. He was forceful, intelligent, and articulate. Sometimes he was witty,
and he was always knowledgeable about cyberpunk and postmodern science
fiction. Often, however, he was obstreperous and out of bounds.
His obstreperousness presented me with not one problem but two. It would
have been a relatively simple matter to put the brakes on -- to speak to
him, in class or afterward, in such a way as to let him know that he was
not, in fact, entitled to comment on every other student's comment. But I
did not want to contribute to his growing sense of lonely opposition.
Meanwhile, his 16 classmates were not, in fact, a unified left-liberal bloc;
some of them were recognizably left of center, but not all. Mere weeks after
September 11, my students had sounded off on an extraordinary range of
questions, including the question of whether that day marked the death of
postmodernism, an issue that The New York Times's Edward Rothstein had
raised. I knew my class contained a handful of people adamantly opposed to
military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan (that put them well to
the left of me), a handful of people who wanted to redraw the Middle East
from scratch in the manner of Paul Wolfowitz, and a handful of people who
called themselves libertarians but whose politics didn't go much beyond
keep-your-laws-off-my-bong.
Actually, some students agreed with John about one thing or another but were
simply annoyed that he was taking up so much class time. They began sending
me e-mail messages and speaking to me privately about how they did not want
John's remarks to set the parameters for class discussion. One student
complained that she was wasting time trying to think of things that John
wouldn't reply to; another said that he found anti-porn feminism obnoxious,
just as John did, but couldn't stand it when people dismissed feminism so
sweepingly as to render suspect other people's more careful critiques (his
own, for example). If I asked John to cool it, then, he would undoubtedly
feel silenced, and I would be in the position of validating what was
perhaps, for him, a stifling liberal hegemony over classroom speech; if I
failed to restrain him, I would in effect be allowing him to dominate the
class, thereby silencing the other students who'd taken the time to speak to
me about the problem.
For the remaining weeks of the semester, I tried to split the difference:
John spoke more often than any other student, but I did not recognize him
every time he asked; when students criticized his remarks, implicitly or
explicitly, I did not validate their criticisms, but I did try to let them
speak in rough proportion to their numbers. For a while, order was restored.
I've been watching the evolution of campus conservatism for more than 20
years now. I remember vividly the reaction of Accuracy in Academia, Reed
Irvine's slightly nutty group that tried to recruit vocal right-wing
students to report on and root out "liberal bias" in the classroom. Accuracy
in Academia has largely disappeared from public view, but conservative
activists have kept up the complaint about liberal campus "bias" all the
same, and after September 11 some of their efforts have taken an especially
nasty turn. The National Review's culture warrior Stanley Kurtz has recently
been instrumental in getting the U.S. House of Representatives to approve a
federal "advisory board" to oversee all of the Higher Education Act's Title
VI programs in international studies, on the paranoid logic that such
programs are spreading anti-Americanism through the works of the late Edward
Said; and the at-large culture warrior David Horowitz has begun a dramatic
campaign to urge alumni and state legislatures to initiate a "diversity"
hiring program to bring more conservative faculty members to the nation's
universities. Horowitz recently received a friendly welcome in Colorado,
where he met with Gov. Bill Owens and gave public speeches denouncing, among
other things, the liberal-leaning cartoons on the office doors of
political-science faculty members.
More interestingly, Horowitz has also circulated an "Academic Bill of
Rights" (he recently sent me a copy for comment via e-mail) that draws on
statements by the American Association of University Professors about
academic freedom that would, if followed closely, prevent precisely the kind
of right-wing hiring initiatives Horowitz is touting. By promoting his Bill
of Rights, he can then collect leftist denunciations of academic freedom and
make the case that the greatest threats to the free exchange of ideas are
... liberal and leftist faculty members.
Horowitz is exaggerating hysterically when he claims that campuses are
one-party states an that 99 percent of all commencement speakers are
Democrats, liberals, or Greens. But it's widely understood that English
departments are well stocked with liberals, and I've often wished we
leftists had less of a presence in literature departments and more of a
presence in state legislatures. (Perhaps it's not too late to engineer a
straight-up swap.)
Still, I have never seen a conservative student on any of the campuses I've
inhabited -- Penn State, the Universities of Illinois and Virginia, and
Columbia -- penalized by a professor for his or her beliefs. I have
sometimes seen conservative students made "uncomfortable" by the remarks of
their peers, and I can even imagine some particularly hypersensitive
conservative undergraduates might be intimidated by the forbidding presence
of liberal-leaning cartoons on faculty members' office doors. But I don't
believe that universities should be in the business of ensuring their
students' comfort in such matters.
I knew that Penn State had weathered an exceptionally unpleasant year in
2000-1, when dozens of students had received anonymous racist letters and
e-mail messages, and the leader of the Black Student Caucus had received
direct death threats. I knew also that my student John had had some kind of
run-in with one of the African-American campus demonstrators that year (in
which he told the demonstrator he was not a racist). I took all that into
consideration in trying to make John feel as if his remarks would always be
welcome in my class so long as he respected his peers' rights to contribute
as well -- and yet, I couldn't shake the feeling that, although John and
students like him might occasionally feel threatened or uncomfortable in
classes like mine, they aren't really in any danger at all. Occasionally the
local campus conservatives like to point to all the things they think the
Penn State administration does for black students: One recent flier
complained that there is now a Paul Robeson Center on the campus (and
Robeson was a Communist!), whereas the campus conservatives have to meet in
a classroom. After I finished shaking my head at the sheer foolishness of
the complaint -- did these kids really think that the Paul Robeson Center
was established as the headquarters of a black-activist organization? -- I
wondered just how many of my conservative white students, if given the
chance, would prefer to be black at Penn State, black in the United States.
In late November, we read Richard Powers's 1988 novel, Prisoner's Dilemma.
Part of it is set during World War II and involves a curious fantasia about
how Walt Disney turns out to be an American of Japanese Ancestry. Appalled
by the 1942 order to intern people of Japanese ancestry living in the United
States, Disney manages to get two of his employees out of the camps so that
they can help him work on a top-secret project, which will not only win this
war but prevent all future wars. I noted that Powers is asking whether it is
right to fight a totalitarian enemy by employing totalitarian tactics, and I
pointed to passages in which he adduces the internment camps as examples of
the game-theory problem known as the prisoner's dilemma, hence the title of
the novel. Two prisoners must decide whether to confess or trust each other
not to squeal. Almost invariably, prisoners choose to confess, even though
mutual trust in the other's steadfastness is clearly the way to go if they
want to (a) stay alive and (b) keep their jail time to a minimum. Powers's
point, of course, is that a world without mutual trust would be a world of
unending world war.
Because it was the fall of 2001, internment camps were hot topics. The two
previous times I had taught the novel, in 1995 and 1999, my students had
never heard about the imprisonment of Japanese-Americans during World War
II, or about the confiscation of their property. But after the debates about
the Patriot Act and the detainees in Guantánamo, everyone in the class had
heard about the World War II camps, and everyone knew the formerly obscure
name of Jeannette Rankin, the Montana representative who had cast the lone
vote against the war resolution after Pearl Harbor and who figures in
Powers's narrative for that reason. Realizing, then, that everything we said
in class about World War II would have sharp resonance for the world after
September 11, I mentioned that Powers has been criticized for apparently
establishing a kind of moral equivalence between Nazi concentration camps
and U.S. internment camps -- since the latter, however outrageous and
indefensible they were in a putatively democratic nation, were not part of a
program of genocide. I asked the class what they thought of that critique.
John wasn't having any of it. There's no moral equivalence here at all;
Powers is out of his mind; and even Powers's critics have gone wrong in
implicitly agreeing to parse out the different forms of moral wrong at
stake -- because, and let's get this much straight, the internment camps
were justified. Far from being "outrageous" and "indefensible," they were a
reasonable security precaution in a desperate time and, furthermore, the
detainees were treated quite well.
At that point, I have to admit, I was flummoxed. I rarely challenge students
directly in the course of class discussion, but I was so stunned that I
almost blurted out, "You've got to be kidding." Even if I had, though, I'm
not sure John would have heard me: The entire classroom was in a minor
uproar, everyone from the pacifists to the drug-law libertarians to the
undecideds chiming in at once to criticize; to say, collectively and
incoherently, OK, pal, this time you've gone too far. "You know nothing
about the Japanese who were imprisoned." "You know nothing about the
Constitution." "You're forgetting that the United States actually issued an
apology to the internees, as well as financial reparations," students said.
For a few seconds, it looked and sounded as if John's classmates wanted to
argue him right out of the room.
So, instead of blurting, I whistled. Loud. "All right. Wait a minute." The
following silence was punctuated by a few low murmurs. "The object here
isn't to pile on," I said over them. "This is, in fact, one of the things
the novel wants us to debate."
"But John," I added, turning to him, "I do want to remind you that you spoke
up quite forcefully, earlier this semester, on behalf of the belief that
we're all Americans first, and that our national and ethnic origins
shouldn't matter. Didn't the internment camps violate that principle?"
No, he said, because here we were dealing with the possibility of treason
during wartime, and some Japanese-Americans had, indeed, been in touch with
relatives in Japan in ways that threatened national security. Fine, I said,
I believe you're quite mistaken about that, and I will be happy to direct
you to sources that will challenge you, but suffice it to say for now that
you reject one of the premises of the novel, somewhat more emphatically than
Powers's harshest critics on this score. Now, let's take this to the rest of
the class. Does the prisoner's dilemma apply to the second world war in the
ways Powers suggests? John here says that the camps were justified. If you
disagree with him, how can you frame your disagreement by reference to the
terms Powers sets out?
We got through the novel, of course -- we didn't lose any lives, and no one
was injured. It was only literary criticism, after all. But the class had
been completely derailed. John was confirmed in his isolation and sense of
opposition, his classmates took to eye-rolling and head-shaking at his
remarks, and, by the time we got in December to Colson Whitehead's 1999 The
Intuitionist, a whimsical allegory about racial uplift and the history of
elevator inspection, John was complaining that there were no good white
characters in the novel. By that point, even I had had enough, and I told
him, via e-mail, that his complaint was not only unwarranted on its face but
thoroughly beside the point: In this class, I said, we are not in the
business of pursuing reductive identity-politics enterprises like looking
for "positive images" in literature, regardless of what group images we
might be talking about.
When the semester was over, I wondered whether John's story was the stuff of
which right-wing legends are made. Would he remember the seminar as the
class in which his right to free speech and debate was trampled by
politically correct groupthink (even though he spoke more often than any
other single student)? He couldn't possibly contend that I'd graded him on
the political content of his remarks, because he'd gotten an A for the
course. But there was no question that he felt embattled, that he didn't see
any contradictions in his argument about the internment camps, and that he
had begun to develop an aggressive/defensive "I'm not a racist, but these
people . . ." mode of speaking that would someday get him either in serious
trouble with some angry hyphenated-Americans or the job Dinesh D'Souza held
at the American Enterprise Institute. In the last couple of weeks of the
term, I found myself speaking to him almost solicitously, as if to say, "You
know, if you understand so little about how some of your remarks might be
taken by members of racial minorities, and yet you say so much about them,
you could be in for some rough times. You might want to read a manual on
tact, perhaps."
But who am I to say such things? For all I know, John might be able to craft
a life in which he can deride African-American ambivalence about integration
and defend Japanese-American internment camps without ever confronting
anyone who disagrees with him.
Reflecting on the course two years later, I've come to see that only a
small, intense class can produce the kind of dynamic we dealt with that
semester -- where I often felt compelled to restrain students from
criticizing someone whose arguments I myself found obnoxious, and where I
had to weigh carefully, seven days a week, what things I could say to
students in the public space of the classroom, and what things I should
reserve for private after-class discussions or follow-up e-mail messages.
And, of course, because of the syllabus, and because of September 11,
students wanted to talk after class, on off days, over the weekend, at
midnight on e-mail, with a professor who would converse with them on all
matters local and global. Few critics of academe -- and even fewer critics
of liberal-left professors -- have any idea what kind of work that entails,
which is one reason, surely, why headlines like "Conservative Student
Punished by Stalinist Campus Orthodoxy" strike those of us who teach as so
surreal.
Over my 20 years in teaching, I've had many conservatives in my classes. I
think I've even had a few Stalinists, too. I've had many intelligent,
articulate students who behaved as if they had a right to speak more often
and at greater length than anyone else in the room; I've had versions of
Reese Witherspoon in Election and Hermione Granger in the Harry Potter
series, who knew the answers to every question ever asked; I've had my share
of blurters with very little sense of social boundaries, a few of whom may
genuinely have had some degree of Asperger's syndrome, with various autistic
or antisocial symptoms. To all such students -- indeed, to all students,
those with disabilities and those without -- I try to apply the standard of
disability law: I make reasonable accommodation for them. The challenge,
though, lies in making reasonable accommodations for students whose
standards of "reasonableness" are significantly different from yours. Few
aspects of teaching are so difficult -- and, I think, so rarely acknowledged
by people who don't teach for a living.
Michael Bérubé is a professor of English at Pennsylvania State University at
University Park.